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Y

ears ago while serving as full-time missionaries, my companion
and I were invited to talk about our faith to an introductory philosophy class at the University of Missouri at Columbia. Since neither
of us knew anything about philosophy, we simply relied on the missionary discussions to make our presentation. Only one member of
the class was hostile, stating that we were “intellectual midgets” compared to Freud and Marx. We took that in stride, not knowing Freud
and Marx except by name. Afterward, as the professor and several
students thanked us, I happened to glance at a book that the professor
had in hand and that evidently was being used as a course text. It was
Bertrand Russell’s Why I Am Not a Christian.1
About a year later, fresh off my mission and at Brigham Young
University, I borrowed Russell’s book from the library and opened
its pages with some trepidation. Before long I realized that I mostly
agreed with Russell, but only because he was attacking a crude caricature of the God I believed in. I didn’t believe in that caricature either.
For all his philosophical learning, Russell had written a shallow, nonthreatening book about religion.
1. Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian: And Other Essays on Religion and
Related Subjects (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957).
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Richard Dawkins, a well-known biologist and critic of religion,
has written a similar book—The God Delusion. The book has gotten a lot of advance publicity and is selling well, but for those who
keep track of such things, its publication is a bit of a nonevent. Here is
another predictable salvo against religion from the world of science.
But it is not science: it is ideology poorly disguised as science. Nor
does its author grasp the nature of religious experience. Dawkins dismisses religious claims after measuring them against a rather badly
misshapen scientific yardstick. This is positivism at its best (or worst):
truth is established scientifically or not at all.
Dawkins would have us believe that Darwinian evolution is the
omni-explanatory solution to all of life’s mysteries. This is an old refrain,
one going back to Ernst Haeckel, Thomas Huxley, H. G. Wells, and, in
more recent decades, Daniel Dennett. It is not science per se, but the
dramatization of science for ideological purposes. Evolutionary biology is a perfectly legitimate theory of science, but like all intellectual
constructions, it has its limitations. This fact, readily acknowledged
by those familiar with quantum theory and Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, has never really seemed to register with life science
enthusiasts like Dawkins. Their passion for universal explanations
harks back to an earlier era when Newtonian science struck many
people as evidence that the human race had finally arrived. Dawkins,
wholly enamored of Darwinian biology, is a curious throwback to that
era; and he, like certain philosophes of the Enlightenment, is eager to
throw traditional religion overboard so as to clear the deck of all ideologies but his own.
It is important to note that Dawkins is not writing in a vacuum.
He is replying to a crowd of thinkers—scientists, philosophers, and
theologians—who in recent decades have tried to harmonize scientific
and religious truth. “What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”
asked Tertullian centuries ago.2 Tertullian’s reply was “nothing,” and
Dawkins’s is the same, although for vastly different reasons. The goal
of harmonizing faith and reason is an old one, but there are pitfalls
along the way; and to his credit, Dawkins does a good job of pointing
2. Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 7.9.
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some of them out. If we invest faith in, say, intelligent design, irreducible complexity, or certain versions of the anthropic principle, all of
which lean on God to make sense of things, what happens when persuasive naturalistic explanations emerge?
This is worldview warfare, not science versus religion. Dawkins
readily admits he is opposed only to the idea of a God who takes a personal interest in humankind and who therefore strives to bring off our
salvation and happiness. His God, if he must use the word, is coincidental with the laws of nature and consequently perfectly oblivious to
our being. This outlook is, of course, not original with Dawkins; most
notably it is associated with Einstein and Spinoza. But neither Einstein
nor Spinoza dogmatically and zealously asserted it. Both took it as a
religious preference, not as a weapon with which to attack and destroy
other religious preferences. Dawkins, however, is a religious firebrand
in scientific guise, and by trying to straitjacket others into his atheistic
worldview, he does science a profound disservice.
In the latter part of the book, Dawkins offers an explanation for
religion. Believing that only Darwinian evolution can get to the bottom of this matter, he weaves an interesting story. But this is not to
say that others, working from different principles, could not weave
equally interesting but very different stories. The problem here is one
that Karl Popper identified decades ago: theories that explain so much
and that seem to be immune to falsification ought to arouse our suspicion.3 A piece of Silly Putty can be easily molded into the shape of an
elephant, a dog, a giraffe, virtually anything we can imagine; but that
does not mean that Silly Putty is the universal substance from which
all the world was created. It is merely a substance that reacts easily to
the human imagination.
Dawkins, it seems, fails to grasp this point. He never admits that
there might be other ways to persuasively spin the empirical data,
to play dot to dot with the events of nature. Rather, he talks as if
Darwinian evolution affords a uniquely unbiased vision of the past.
Yet anyone who closely attends to his explanations of the past notes
3. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge
(New York: Basic Books, 1962).
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that they become obscure just at the critical moment. In this respect
The God Delusion is exactly like The Selfish Gene,4 Dawkins’s most
sustained attempt to deal with our biological origins. The selfish gene,
he says, began as a lifeless unit, void of intentionality. Eventually,
however, it evolved into a living, purposive, “selfish” thing, though
Dawkins never specifies quite how this happened. He can only say
that natural selection—the mechanism that drives organic evolution—brought it about. Thus, while straining at the gnat of the selfish
gene, Dawkins swallows the miracle of life that he is quick to disavow
in religious contexts. After getting past this hitch, however, he is able
to talk with great confidence, and his explanations come off as persuasive, albeit for reasons just indicated. Many people, unfortunately,
overlook the leap of faith taken at the outset of the explanation (the
assertion that natural selection somehow or other brings life into existence) and uncritically take that leap with Dawkins.
This failure to deal with fundamental issues affords Dawkins a
great deal of argumentative mileage. A case in point is his claim that
natural selection is not a random process. (He concedes the improbability of life originating from purely random processes.) He compares
it to a combination lock that noticeably clicks each time one of the key
digits is passed, thus allowing the person turning the lock to quickly
decipher its code. Elsewhere5 Dawkins puts a similar spin on the old
monkey-at-the-typewriter argument by insisting that a monkey could
type out a line from Shakespeare in fairly short order: each time the
monkey accidentally hits a correct character it gets locked in, while
all the incorrect characters are immediately erased. Thus the monkey,
completely unaware of what it is accomplishing, never has to start over
from scratch—the process itself is self-improving. It retains correct
characters, discards those that are incorrect, and, after sufficient iterations, produces a fully coherent sentence.
But for a monkey to do this, its typewriter would have to be programmed, and who or what is the programmer? Dawkins assigns that
4. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
5. See Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution
Reveals a Universe Without Design (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996).
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role to natural selection. So on the one hand natural selection is blind
and mindless, and on the other it is teleological. This is a contradiction that goes back to Darwin’s personification of natural selection (he
once described nature as “infinitely more sagacious than man” and as
an “all-seeing being” that is ever “rigid and scrutinizing”),6 and it cuts
so deeply as to shape up as yet another leap of faith. Dawkins might
deny this by arguing that each tiny step of the evolutionary process
gets locked in by virtue of its survival value, but it is by no means clear
that this is always the case. More fundamentally, one wonders whence
survival gets its intrinsic value in a cosmos initially devoid of value,
which is the kind of cosmos Dawkins posits.
An old adage states that to a man with a hammer everything
looks like a nail. This, no doubt, is an overstatement, but certainly to
Dawkins any religious belief is something to be pounded on by the
ideological hammer of atheistic science. One of his chief complaints
against traditional religion is the religious intolerance that flares up
in such places as Israel, Iraq, Northern Ireland, and even the United
States. Granted, this is lamentable, but Dawkins’s own brand of intolerance only exacerbates the problem. What is needed is not diatribe
but dialogue and an openness to new ways of thinking and feeling.
Religious experience may not make much sense to Dawkins, but, as
William James would say, that is because he chooses to stand outside it: “One can never fathom an emotion or divine its dictates by
standing outside of it. In the glowing hour of excitement, however, all
incomprehensibilities are solved, and what was so enigmatical from
without becomes transparently obvious. Each emotion obeys a logic
of its own, and makes deductions which no other logic can draw. Piety
and charity live in a different universe from worldly lusts and fears,
and form another centre of energy altogether.”7 Dawkins gives us one
universe or thought world, but there are many others.

6. Charles Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace, Evolution by Natural Selection (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958), 45–48.
7. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Barnes & Noble,
2004), 286.

